# Why the Data Suggests Managers Should Stop Bringing On Penalty Specialists

URL: https://technosports.co.in/world-cup-managers-should-stop-bringing-penalty/  
Published: 2026-07-01  
Updated: 2026-07-01  
Author: Ankush Mallick

Taking a penalty is, in theory, one of the simplest tasks in football. The ball is stationary. The goal is 12 yards away. At the elite level, the expectation is that every professional should be able to score almost every time.

But pressure does funny things to people.

Fabián Balbuena entered the pitch in the 121st minute of Paraguay’s last-32 tie against Germany at [World Cup 2026](https://www.fifa.com/en/tournaments/mens/worldcup/canadamexicousa2026). His manager, Gustavo Alfaro, had made a clear calculation: bring on a player he trusted from the spot, give Paraguay the best possible chance when the shootout arrived. Balbuena, the former West Ham United centre-back, stepped up to take Paraguay’s fifth penalty with a historic upset within touching distance.

Manuel Neuer saved it.

Paraguay’s blushes were spared only because Jonathan Tah blazed his effort over the bar, and José Canale converted to complete one of the most extraordinary results in World Cup history. But in the immediate aftermath of Balbuena’s miss, a recurring and largely unresolved debate in football tactics resurfaced with fresh urgency: does bringing on a substitute specifically to take a penalty in a shootout actually work?

The data, accumulated across World Cups and European Championships, suggests the answer is far more complicated than the theory implies.

## The Logic Behind the Late Substitution

The reasoning is intuitive enough. Penalty shootouts are decided by fine margins, and a player who is fresh, composed and practised from the spot offers something different to an outfield player who has just spent 120 minutes grinding through extra time. Why trust an exhausted midfielder over someone who has specifically prepared for this moment?

It has become an increasingly common tactic at major international tournaments. Only 12 players have ever entered a World Cup or European Championship match after the 115th minute and gone on to take a penalty in the subsequent shootout. Of those 12 instances, only three occurred before Euro 2016. The trend has accelerated in the data-driven era of modern football — which makes what the data actually shows all the more striking.

![World Cup 2026](https://technosports.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Substitute-penalty-conversion-rate-at-major-tournaments-Opta-1024x1024.jpg)

Eight of the last ten players to be substituted on after the 115th minute ahead of a penalty shootout at a UEFA European Championship or FIFA World Cup have gone on to miss their penalty.

That is a conversion rate of just 20%.

## England’s Painful Contribution to the Record

Three of those eight misses belong to England, a nation with a painful enough penalty history without adding the specifics of this particular tactical gamble.

Jamie Carragher was introduced in the 119th minute of England’s 2006 World Cup quarter-final against Portugal in Germany. He touched the ball exactly once before the final whistle. When the shootout arrived, Carragher stepped up, saw his penalty saved, and was given a re-take — which he also missed — as England crashed out.

Fourteen years later, Gareth Southgate made his own version of the same calculation in the final seconds of the Euro 2020 final against Italy at Wembley. Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho were introduced in the closing moments of extra time. Both players missed their penalties. Italy won the European Championship.

![](https://technosports.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/The-last-10-players-to-take-a-penalty-after-being-subbed-on-after-the-115th-minute-of-a-major-tournament-Opta-1024x1024.jpg)

At least Carragher, Rashford and Sancho had touched the ball before the whistle blew, giving themselves some minimal connection to the rhythm and pace of the match. Two of the twelve players in this record have entered the pitch without a single touch before taking a penalty — and both missed.

Balbuena, against Germany at World Cup 2026, is the most recent example. Before him came Simone Zaza, whose cameo in Italy’s Euro 2016 quarter-final defeat to Germany yielded one of the most discussed penalty misses in recent memory, largely due to his unorthodox and extensive run-up that ended with the ball flying well wide of goal.

## The Full Record: Late Substitutes in Shootouts

**Players Substituted on After the 115th Minute in World Cup or European Championship Shootouts**

| Player | Tournament | Match | Entry Minute | Touched Ball Before Shootout | Penalty Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Simone Zaza | Euro 2016 | Italy vs Germany (QF) | Late ET | No | Missed |
| Marcus Rashford | Euro 2020 | England vs Italy (Final) | Late ET | Minimal | Missed |
| Jadon Sancho | Euro 2020 | England vs Italy (Final) | Late ET | Minimal | Missed |
| Jamie Carragher | World Cup 2006 | England vs Portugal (QF) | 119th min | One touch | Missed (re-take also missed) |
| Fabián Balbuena | World Cup 2026 | Paraguay vs Germany (R32) | 121st min | No | Missed |

![](https://technosports.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Penalty-record-since-euro-96-Subs-vs-starters-1024x1024.jpg)

Of the last ten players to enter after the 115th minute before a shootout at a major international tournament, eight have missed. The two who scored represent the only evidence the tactic can work — and even that does not constitute a convincing argument for its regular use.

## What the Broader Numbers Say

The late-substitution miss rate does not exist in isolation. When you look at the wider penalty shootout record at major international tournaments — World Cups and European Championships since Euro 1996 — the gap between starters and second-half substitutes tells a clear story.

**Penalty Conversion Rates in Major International Tournament Shootouts (Since Euro 1996)**

| Player Category | Penalties Taken | Scored | Conversion Rate |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Players who started the match | 277 | 201 | 73% |
| Players introduced in second half of extra time | 32 | 18 | 56% |

The difference is significant. Players who started the match convert at 73%. Players introduced during the second half of extra time — which covers the 106th minute onwards — convert at 56%. That is not a marginal gap. It is a 17-percentage-point difference across a meaningful sample size.

The implication is uncomfortable for managers who rely on the late-substitution strategy. Fresh legs do not appear to equate to a fresh mind when the pressure reaches its peak. If anything, the absence of competitive engagement in the match — the adrenaline, the momentum, the feel for pace and tempo — may leave players cold at the worst possible moment.

## Why Does the Tactic Fail?

There is no single agreed explanation, but several factors likely contribute.

**Lack of rhythm.** Penalty-taking in training is a controlled environment. Stepping up in a World Cup shootout, having played three or four minutes of a match you have had almost no involvement in, is categorically different. Players who have been on the pitch for the full 120 minutes have at least processed the intensity of the occasion. Late substitutes are dropped into the pressure cooker without acclimatisation.

**The psychology of purpose.** Being brought on specifically to take a penalty carries its own psychological weight. Every player on the pitch and in the stadium knows why you are there. The responsibility is explicit in a way it is not for a player who has earned their place in the shootout through participation in the match. That awareness does not always help.

**No feel for the game.** Balbuena entered the pitch without touching the ball. Zaza did the same. Neither player had any organic connection to the match by the time they stepped up. The distance between the training ground and the penalty spot felt, in those moments, very short — and not in a helpful way.

**Sample bias in selection.** Managers who use this tactic are self-selecting for players they believe to be reliable penalty takers. The fact that those players are still missing at a rate of 80% in the most recent ten instances suggests that belief, however well-founded in training data, does not hold under the specific conditions of a shootout.

## The Balbuena Case Revisited

Balbuena’s situation at World Cup 2026 was, in many respects, a textbook example of the tactic deployed under optimal conditions. Paraguay were facing Germany — a nation with a formidable shootout record — and Alfaro made the call to bring in a player he trusted. Balbuena had presumably demonstrated his ability from the spot in training. He was brought on to do one thing.

He did not do it.

The broader context of the game salvaged Paraguay’s result — Tah’s miss and Canale’s composure saw them through — but Balbuena’s contribution underlined the core problem with the strategy. The tactic is built on the assumption that penalty-taking is a transferable skill that holds under any conditions. The evidence suggests it is not.

There is a version of the argument that says the sample size of 12 is still too small for definitive conclusions. That is fair. But 20% conversion among the last ten late-entry substitutes at World Cups and European Championships is not noise in the data — it is a pattern, and it is one that managers continue to ignore.

## Has the Tactic Ever Made Sense?

In specific circumstances, the logic retains some surface validity. If a manager is genuinely convinced that their starting eleven contains no reliable penalty takers, and has a substitute whose record from the spot in training is exceptional, then the calculus changes slightly. Not every squad is built equal from twelve yards.

But the broader point stands: the data does not support making this a routine tactical option. A player who has been engaged in the match, who has processed the atmosphere, who has had their muscles warm and their mind active for 120 minutes, is statistically more likely to score than someone introduced in the final minutes for the sole purpose of taking a penalty.

**Conversion Rate by Participation Level**

| Category | Conversion Rate |
| --- | --- |
| Match starters | 73% |
| Second-half extra-time substitutes | 56% |
| Substitutes after 115th minute (last 10 cases) | 20% |

The more extreme the late substitution, the worse the outcome. That progression is not coincidental.

## What Should Managers Do Instead?

The alternative is less dramatic but more effective: identify reliable penalty takers within the group of players most likely to still be on the pitch at the end of extra time, and ensure they are prepared. Practice under simulated pressure. Have a clear order. Trust the preparation.

Several nations have moved in this direction, employing data teams to analyse goalkeeper tendencies and develop individualised penalty strategies for each player. That approach — quiet, methodical, unglamorous — produces results at a rate that the theatrical late substitution simply does not match.

The late-substitution tactic, by contrast, has increasingly become a gesture of managerial anxiety disguised as decisiveness. It signals to the crowd that a decision is being made. Whether that decision improves the odds is another matter entirely — and the evidence from World Cup 2026 and the tournaments that preceded it suggests it probably does not.

Read More: [FIFA World Cup 2026 Round of 32: Côte d’Ivoire vs Norway Match Report – Erling Haaland’s Late Strike Powers Norway Past Ivory Coast to Reach Round of 16](https://technosports.co.in/fifa-world-cup-2026-cote-divoire-vs-norway/)

## FAQs

### What is the conversion rate for late substitutes brought on specifically for penalty shootouts?

Among the last ten players substituted on after the 115th minute before a shootout at a World Cup or European Championship, only two scored — a conversion rate of 20%.

### How does that compare to players who started the match?

Players who started the match have converted 73% of their penalties in major international tournament shootouts since Euro 1996, compared to 56% for players introduced during the second half of extra time.

### Who are some of the notable players to have missed after being brought on late for a penalty?

Notable examples include Jamie Carragher at the 2006 World Cup, Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho at Euro 2020, Simone Zaza at Euro 2016, and Fabián Balbuena at World Cup 2026 against Germany.

### Has any player entered a shootout without touching the ball and scored?

Of the documented cases at World Cups and European Championships, both players who entered without touching the ball before the shootout — Simone Zaza and Fabián Balbuena — went on to miss their penalties.

### Why do late substitutes tend to underperform in penalty shootouts?

The most likely factors include a lack of rhythm and feel for the game, the psychological weight of being brought on exclusively to take a penalty, and the absence of the competitive acclimatisation that comes from participating in the match.