Roberto De Zerbi has been handed one of the most pressurised managerial briefs in recent Premier League history: keep Tottenham Hotspur in the top flight with seven games to go. The Italian brings a distinctive, demanding brand of football with him — one that could barely be further from what this Spurs squad has been playing all season. The question is not whether De Zerbi can coach. It is whether there is enough time for his players to learn.
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Why Tottenham Needed a Change
Spurs have not won a Premier League game since December. A cushion of 12 points above the relegation zone on the first day of January has shrunk to one point with seven fixtures remaining. The club that has played in Europe in 18 of the last 20 seasons and reached the Champions League final only seven years ago is staring at relegation to the Championship — the second tier of English football — for the first time since 1977.
The financial and reputational consequences would be severe. That reality has driven Tottenham to make an expensive, long-term commitment to De Zerbi at a moment when they really only wanted a short-term firefighter. The Italian demanded a five-year deal and got it, making him one of the Premier League’s highest-paid managers. Whether the arrangement lasts beyond the summer is secondary. Right now, all that matters are the next seven games.
What Is Roberto De Zerbi’s Style of Play?
De Zerbi’s football has a clear and consistent identity across every club he has managed: possession-based, press-baiting, built around short passes and a willingness to take risks in dangerous areas of the pitch to maintain control of the ball.
The simplest summary is that he wants his team to have the ball, keep it through all thirds of the pitch — including very close to their own goal — and draw the opposition out before playing through them. His Brighton side were the clearest expression of this in England.
The Brighton Blueprint
From the moment he took charge at Brighton in September 2022 through to the end of the 2023-24 season, De Zerbi’s side led the Premier League in two particularly revealing statistics.
| Metric | Brighton (De Zerbi era) | League Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| Passes ending in own defensive third (per game) | 159.8 | At least 12 more than any other team |
| Passes ending in own penalty area (per game) | 42.5 | Highest in the league |
| Sequences of 10+ passes | 1,256 | Second only to Manchester City (1,585) |
| Average passes per sequence | 4.6 | Second only to Manchester City (5.4) |
| Attack pace (metres per second) | 1.60 | Fourth slowest — only City, Burnley, Wolves slower |
The numbers tell the story. Brighton under De Zerbi played with a slow, deliberate, almost provocative patience. They invited pressure by keeping the ball in their own third, daring opponents to press them, and then playing through that press to find space further up the pitch.
High Press, High Engagement
It was not passive possession. De Zerbi’s teams press aggressively when they lose the ball.
| Metric | Brighton | League Rank |
|---|---|---|
| PPDA (passes allowed per defensive action) | 10.5 | Second only to Liverpool (9.6) |
| High turnovers | 626 | Sixth in the league |
| Shot-ending high turnovers | 115 | Fourth in the league |
The press was effective — Brighton were one of the best teams in the league at winning the ball high up the pitch and turning those recoveries into chances.
The Risks It Carries
The approach was not without cost. Keeping the ball so deep, and playing through pressure rather than away from it, inevitably produced mistakes.
| Risk Metric | Brighton | League Context |
|---|---|---|
| High turnovers conceded (within 40m of own goal) | 288 | Fourth-most in the league |
| High turnovers conceded leading to opposition shot | 48 | Second-most — only Chelsea (53) worse |
| Goals conceded from opposition counter-attacks | 15 | Most in the league |
| Shots faced on the break | 51 | Second-most — only Liverpool (57) more |
De Zerbi insisted his players held the line regardless. The philosophy was non-negotiable: keep playing, accept the risk, trust the system. It worked in aggregate — Brighton scored in 32 consecutive Premier League games from March 2023 onwards, the sixth-longest such streak in the competition’s history. But they also conceded in 20 games during that same run, and won only 15 of those 32.
An unflinching commitment to possession football that produces plenty of goals at both ends. It should sound familiar to anyone who watched Spurs under Ange Postecoglou.
The Gap Between De Zerbi’s Football and What Spurs Have Been Playing
The challenge at Tottenham is not just learning a new system. It is unlearning the current one — and doing both simultaneously, in real Premier League games, with relegation on the line.
Under Thomas Frank and then Igor Tudor this season, Spurs have played a defence-first, possession-light game centred on long balls and set-pieces. The contrast with De Zerbi’s ideals could scarcely be more stark.
| Metric | Spurs (2024-25) | Premier League Rank |
|---|---|---|
| Average possession | 49.6% | 11th |
| Long pass rate | 12.2% of all passes | 11th highest |
| Progressive passes per game | 19.3 | 14th |
| Open-play xG (31 games) | 21.1 | 15th |
| Goals from set-pieces | 35.0% | Second-highest (behind only Leeds, 35.1%) |
Progressive passes are the clearest indicator of a team’s ability to advance the ball purposefully through the opposition’s half — successful open-play passes in the attacking two-thirds of the pitch that move it at least 25% closer to the opponent’s goal. Spurs average just 19.3 of these per game, ranking 14th in the league. A team playing De Zerbi’s football would expect to rank considerably higher.
The north London derby defeat to Arsenal in February illustrated the problem in stark terms. Spurs completed just seven progressive passes in that game — only six teams have managed fewer in a Premier League match this entire season, and one of them was Spurs themselves at the Emirates in November, where they managed six.
This is the starting point. De Zerbi needs to transform a team that has been playing the opposite of his football into one that can execute it — in the next seven games.
Can Tottenham Learn It Quickly?
The Brighton Precedent Offers Mixed Signals
De Zerbi failed to win any of his first five Premier League games at Brighton. He did win four of his first five at Marseille, but that was a different league, a different context, and a team that already played more expansive football. The Brighton situation is the more relevant comparison — another mid-season Premier League appointment where he had to implement his system on the job, without a pre-season.
At Brighton, there was a crucial advantage: Graham Potter had already moved the club towards a possession-based, high-press identity, so De Zerbi was building on a foundation that already existed. At Tottenham, the stylistic leap is far greater. The players have spent the best part of a full season playing the opposite of what De Zerbi demands.
The Postecoglou Connection
There is one argument in favour of a faster adaptation. Many of the players from the Postecoglou era at Spurs remain in the squad, and Postecoglou’s football carried clear similarities with De Zerbi’s: possession-based, press-heavy, and producing plenty of action at both ends. Those players have some muscle memory of playing in this way, even if it has been dormant for well over a year.
The key difference is that even Postecoglou had largely abandoned his preferred approach by the time Spurs won the Europa League last season. So the familiarity exists in theory, but it has not been in practice for some time.
Pragmatism May Be the Answer
De Zerbi is idealistic about his football, but he is not naive. He will know that this is not a moment for philosophical purity. It is a moment for results. The Premier League has also evolved since his Brighton tenure — it is a more transitional game now, with greater emphasis on direct football and counter-attacking. Even Pep Guardiola has acknowledged and adapted to that shift.
Spurs have counter-attacking quality in their squad, and it served them well under Postecoglou in Europe. Channelling some of that energy — rather than insisting immediately on slow, patient build-up from the back — may be the pragmatic adjustment De Zerbi needs to make in the short term.
The Injury Return Factor
Tottenham are also not without hope from a squad perspective. Important players are returning from injury, which means De Zerbi will have more options than Frank or Tudor had in the low points of the season. A fresher, more complete squad gives the new manager better raw material to work with, even if the system is still being absorbed.
The Verdict
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| De Zerbi’s coaching quality | Unquestionable |
| Stylistic fit with current Spurs | Very poor starting point |
| Precedent for quick adaptation | Mixed — slow start at Brighton |
| Player familiarity with similar football | Partial, via Postecoglou era |
| Time available | Seven games — critically limited |
| Consequences of failure | Relegation for first time since 1977 |
De Zerbi is a manager of genuine quality. His track record at Brighton and Marseille demonstrates that clearly enough. The concern at Tottenham is not whether he can coach, but whether seven games is enough time for a squad playing the wrong kind of football to absorb a system built on trust, pattern recognition and the kind of instinctive decision-making that only comes from repetition.
If it works — if even a partial version of De Zerbi’s philosophy takes hold quickly enough — there is genuine excitement to be had. This is a team with quality in it, and De Zerbi’s football, when it clicks, is among the most watchable in Europe. But the gap between where Spurs are and where they need to be, both in the table and in terms of style of play, is enormous. He has the right ideas. Whether he has enough time is another question entirely.
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FAQs
What is Roberto De Zerbi’s style of play?
De Zerbi favours a possession-based, press-baiting approach built on short passing, slow and deliberate build-up through all thirds of the pitch, and a high press when out of possession. His Brighton side were an extreme version of this — keeping the ball deep in their own half to draw opponents out before playing through them.
Why did Tottenham appoint Roberto De Zerbi?
With Spurs just one point above the relegation zone and seven games remaining, the club needed a manager capable of reversing a dramatic slump. De Zerbi was seen as the right long-term appointment, even though the immediate priority is simply staying in the Premier League.
What are the risks of De Zerbi’s style?
His teams tend to concede a significant number of chances from counter-attacks as a result of playing out from deep and keeping possession in risky areas. At Brighton, they conceded more goals from opposition counters than any other Premier League club during his tenure.
How is De Zerbi’s football different from what Spurs have been playing?
Under Frank and Tudor this season, Spurs have ranked 11th for possession, 14th for progressive passes and 15th for open-play expected goals — playing a defence-first, long-ball style. De Zerbi’s football is almost the polar opposite in every category.
Did De Zerbi win his first games at Brighton?
No. He failed to win any of his first five Premier League matches at Brighton after taking over mid-season in September 2022 — which is why Spurs fans are right to temper their expectations about an instant turnaround.
